A common misunderstanding of Duverger's Law is that it produces two-party competition in legislatures using a plurality electoral system such as the lower houses of Canada, India and the UK. Because political historians have failed to characterise the UK party system correctly, they have, in general, failed to notice that Duverger's Law is compatible with a multiparty legislature, in which parties from outlying parts of the Union may be pivotal. The best index of their pivotality is that which was proposed by Lionel Penrose in 1946. This article uses Penrose's index to identify the occasions since 1874 on which the outlying parties have had the power to modify the Union or impose other policy priorities. The first and second sections of the article deal with Duverger and Penrose; the third and fourth deal with the power of the periphery since 1874. The conclusion examines the implications of our findings and suggests further research.
Duverger's Law
According to Duverger's Law, 'The simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system' (Duverger, 1954, p. 217 ). Duverger's Law contains both mechanical and rational calculation components. The mechanical component is the responsiveness (Cox and Katz, 2002, pp. 32-7) of the plurality electoral system. An electoral system may be viewed as a mapping from votes to seats. Let the vote share of parties i and j be denoted by v i and v j and their seat shares by s i and s j . Then the mapping may be written as: 
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where e is an error term, and the exponent a denotes the responsiveness of the system. If a = 1, the mapping is proportional representation. If a < 1, the system is relatively unresponsive. If a > 1, the system is relatively responsive.
The plurality electoral system is highly responsive as between the two leading parties in nationwide, multidistrict competition. Early work (Parker Smith, 1910; Kendall and Stuart, 1950 ) assumed a = 3 for general elections to the UK House of Commons. Accordingly, Kendall and Stuart called the relationship the 'cube law'. However, for some nineteenth-century general elections, a > 3 (McLean, 2001, pp. 87-112) . For late twentieth and twenty-first-century general elections, 1 < a < 3 (Curtice and Steed, 1986 ).
This high responsiveness usually guarantees that the largest single party wins more than half of the seats in the House of Commons and forms a single-party administration. Of the 43 UK general elections since 1832 inclusive, 35 (81.40 percent) have resulted in a single party winning more than half of the seats. For a single party to win more than half of the vote is much rarer. In the 33 UK general elections since 1874, the leading party has gained more than half of the vote only six times (that is, 18 percent of the time). 1 Four of those six cases were in the nineteenth century when there were still numerous unopposed returns, especially in Ireland. Only in 1931 and 1935 did the winning party indisputably win more than half of the votes. The joint probability that the largest party will win more than half of the seats and not win more than half of the vote in a UK general election exceeds 0.5.
Usually, therefore, only two parties are capable of forming a UK government. Except between 1918 and 1924 , no informed citizen has had any reason to doubt which two. By the rational calculation component of Duverger's Law, agents realise that it is futile for parties to run and for electors to support any candidate except one of the top two in each district. However, this is a statement about what is rational at district level. Each elector should rationally ask Which parties are in contention in my district? not Which parties are in contention to form the next government of the UK? Since 1983, for instance, the pattern of party competition in England has featured two main sets of districts: those where the two leading parties are Labour and the Conservatives and those where the two leading parties are the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. In a few parts of urban England, there are Labour-Liberal Democrat contests. In Scotland and Wales, four parties are in contention: the three main UK-wide parties and the local separatist/nationalist party, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (PC). In any one district, fewer than four parties are in contention, but the patterns of competition are such that in each country, all four have a reasonable chance. The Conservative Party won one seat in Scotland in 2001. Table 1 displays these patterns.
The lower section of Table 1 lists the leading patterns of Duvergerian competition. There are 11 possible combinations of first and second parties.
2 However, the table shows that five combinations account for 649 (98.5 percent) of the total contests in 2001: Labour-Conservative (414 seats), Conservative-Liberal Democrat (102 seats), Labour-Nationalist (58 seats), Labour-Liberal Democrat (57 seats) and the 18 seats in Northern Ireland (NI), uncontested by any Great Britain parties. In NI, there are two clearly delineated communities, of unionists and nationalists. Within each community, there are moderate and extreme parties. The (Northern) Irish Unionists were allied with the Conservatives between 1886 and 1972.
The UK parties which wish to weaken or dissolve the Union, are the SNP PC and the main NI nationalist parties, the Social Democratic and Labour party and Sinn Fein (SF). The Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party wish to strengthen it. The operation of Duverger's Law at constituency level therefore generates multiparty competition at national level, with parties that wish to amend the Union being more likely to be pivotal than minor UK-wide parties.
This situation is not new. The SNP and PC have been in contention since the Parliament of 1966-70 when each of them won a by-election. The Irish Unionists have been identifiable as a separate group since 1886; the Irish nationalists since 1832, albeit with a break between 1852 and 1874. Before 1918, Ireland elected 105 members of parliament (MPs).
Where the local pattern of two-party competition differs from the standard English pattern, Duverger's Law may fail to deliver the responsive and exaggerative properties for which it is famous. It may also produce one hegemonic party and fragmented opposition parties, each with strength in only some regions of the country, as has frequently happened in Canada and India. A standard measure shows that the effective number in the House of Commons has always exceeded two except in the one-sided cases of 1931 and 1935. On average, Table 2 shows that the Effective Number (EN) score exceeded 2.5 when the whole of Ireland was in the UK, dropping to just over 2.1 on average in the subsequent period.
When can a localised party influence political outcomes? A party has anticipatory power if the incumbent party has a reasonable fear that the challenger may gain seats at the next election unless its supporters can be placated. An opposition party has real power only if an election has failed to give any party a quota of seats, where a quota is the minimum number necessary to carry legislation. A minor party whose support is geographically dispersed wins few or no seats in plurality systems because of the operation of Duverger's Law. The Labour party would have won almost no seats before 1914 but for special situations such as local splits within the other parties and the pact under which the Liberals gave them a free run in about 50 seats in 1903. The Liberal concessions to the Labour party between 1906 and 1914 can therefore be explained only in terms of Labour's anticipatory power, not its real voting power (McLean, 2001, pp. 87-112 But they have had more real voting power than dispersed UK-wide parties of the same size. They have never been potential governments of the UK. But from time to time, they have posed either of two threats to the Union:
• an electorally credible threat to walk out. SF did so in 1918 and refuses to take its seats now. Nothing could bring SF back. The SNP said it would negotiate independence in 1974 if it won more than half of the seats in Scotland. The Source: Our calculations, using Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) formula N = 1/ Sp i 2 where p i = the ith party's proportion of seats.
credibility of the SNP threat in 1974 helps to explain the Labour party's policy reversal on devolution in that year (McLean, 2004) .
• veto power in the House of Commons.
3 A party has veto power if it can turn an otherwise winning coalition into a losing coalition by defecting from it or an otherwise losing coalition into a winning coalition by joining it. As the House of Commons rarely uses qualified majority voting, that is tantamount to moving a coalition from one side of 50 percent to the other side of it. We analyse all cases since 1874 when a minor party has held power of this sort in the Commons. It turns out that parties which wished to modify the Union have been pivotal far more often than any other class of minor party. Lionel Penrose's (1946) seminal contribution to political science had to be reinvented more than once before its force was recognised. He formalised the intuition of the previous paragraph and proposed the concept of a power index as described below. In what is now widespread terminology, decision-making in the House of Commons is an example of a weighted voting game (WVG) between parties. 4 A WVG is simply a list of weights and a quota. In a Parliamentary voting game, the quota is determined by the rules of the house. In Commons roll-calls, the quota is a simple majority of the votes cast. In a full house, therefore, the quota is half of the total number of seats rounded up to the next integer.
Penrose's Power Index
The size of the parties in the House of Commons after each general election between 1874 and 1918 is given in Table 3 and for the 1922-2001 period in Table 4 .
From Table 3 , we see that in the House elected in 1892, there were 272 Liberal MPs, 269 Conservatives, 72 members of the main (anti-Parnellite) branch of the Irish Party, 45 Liberal Unionists, nine Parnellite Irish members and three Labour members. The house size was 670, and the quota was therefore 336. 5 The Commons of 1892 can therefore be stripped down to:
A party is pivotal if it can turn a losing vote into a winning vote or a winning vote into a losing vote. Such an event is labelled a 'swing' in Tables 3 and 4 . The Penrose method then assumes that all possible combinations of parties are equally probable. The Penrose index (or Penrose measure) for any party a is the a priori probability that, in a division on a bill, the votes will be so disposed that if a's vote were to be reversed then the fate of the bill would also be reversed ... [Alternatively, it] is the conditional probability -given that we know how a will vote -that the fate of the bill would be reversed were a to vote otherwise (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998, p. 40) .
In the Commons of 1892, there are 16 swings for each of the Liberals, the Conservatives and the majority Irish faction, that is, the three largest elements in WVG 1892 . There are no swings for any of the three other elements in WVG 1892 . Therefore, three parties have power, and three are powerless. Each of the three parties Craig (1974) ; Stenton and Lees (1976-81) and Dictionary of National Biography, compact disc version. with power faces a total of 32 possible divisions of the other parties and participates in 16 swings. Therefore, its Penrose index value, the probability of a swing, is 16/32 = 0.5. The Penrose index for the other three groups is, of course, 0. These are dummy players. There is no coalition to which any of them is crucial.
Penrose's approach to voting power measurement has been reinvented several times. (It is also referred to as the Absolute Banzhaf index. For the history of power indices, see Felsenthal and Machover, 1998, pp. 610 onwards) . Moreover, other power indices have been invented on the basis of different assumptions and with different properties. We do not need to go into the merits of different indices here. We adopt the Penrose index on the grounds that it is a measure of a priori voting power that is supported by theoretical arguments and is becoming increasingly widely accepted as the appropriate index to use in empirical applications (see Felsenthal and Machover, 2004) .
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The Penrose index is an a priori power index, which means that it measures the formal, constitutional voting power of a party when all theoretically possible coalitions are considered. This is not the same as the actual power a party may possess, which must take into account its policies in relation to those of the other parties as well as the formally defined WVG. Although it is policy blind, a priori voting power is still a useful concept, because it enables us to identify cases where a party may have no power. An a priori power index of zero means that the actual voting power is also zero. Where it is non-zero, we discuss its relevance to its actual power in the parliament concerned. The next two sections are not a mere fragmentary line-up of results. They cover every case in which minor parties have been pivotal since 1874.
The Unity of the UK 1874-1918
The first Irish Nationalists were the Repealers organised by Daniel O'Connell, 'The Liberator', in the Parliaments of 1832-47. They peaked at 37 seats in the 1847 Parliament, when the party system had just been shattered by Sir Robert Peel's Repeal of the Corn Laws (McLean, 2001, pp. 33-54) . But O'Connell died in 1847, and his party disintegrated. The horror of the Famine of 1845-7 seems to have turned Irish politics inward. Not until 1874, under Isaac Butt, did the Irish Home Rulers regroup as a bloc. Butt's successor, Charles Stuart Parnell, formed the Irish Party into a compact and deadly wielder of power. In the 1880 Parliament, the Irish Party had no veto power given the party numbers and the quota. However, Parnell had perfected parliamentary obstruction and filibustering, bringing business to a halt until the two main British parties collaborated on introducing guillotine and closure procedures between 1881 and 1887 (Morley, 1908, p. ii: 463) .
The extension of the franchise in 1884-5 consolidated the power of the Irish Party in Catholic Ireland. In the General Election of November 1885, Parnell's party reached its peak strength of 86, winning a majority of seats even in the province of Ulster. Another way to characterise the Commons of 1885 is shown in Table 3 as '1885b'. Five of the 16 independent Liberals were the members from the far north-west of Scotland, who became known as the 'Crofters' Party'. In the 1885b line of Table  3 , they are shown as 'Others'. So we can write:
The Highlands of Scotland shared with the West of Ireland:
• absentee landlords, • a history of famine and emigration, and • subsistence farming on below-subsistence plots.
There had been some rural disorder there, although a pale shadow of the Irish Land Campaign of 1879-85. As soon as local male householders were enfranchised, they elected MPs who pressed their grievances. The 'revolutionary Crofters Act 1886', as Kellas (1980, p. 155 ) appropriately calls it, gave security of tenure to crofters even without legal title to the land they farmed. It created a Crofters' Commission, which still exists, to protect crofting tenure. Unlike in Ireland, land grievances were kept apart from nationalist grievances. The power indices for 1885b explain how the Crofter MPs could pull off this coup: the Crofters' party had one swing in a coalition with the Conservatives and Irish. The line 1918b shows that the Conservatives alone held more than half of the seats in the House. Therefore, their voting power was total and that of all other parties was zero. But the Coalition continued until the Conservative backbenches revolted against it in autumn 1922, overthrowing the Liberal Prime Minister Lloyd George and their own leadership together (Ramsden, 1997) . This only makes Lloyd George's leadership all the more astonishing (McLean, 2001, pp. 153-93) . He almost got a new alignment of British politics, and he did get an Irish settlement that had eluded Pitt, Peel, Gladstone and Asquith, all while being a redundant member of an oversized coalition (see Riker, 1962) . The Conservatives could have thrown him out at any time after the 1918 election. The surprise is not that they did, but that they took so long about it. Table 4 presents the power indices for all party blocs in UK Parliaments since the Commons took on its current shape.
The Unity of the UK 1922-2001
The first three columns of Table 4 give the number of seats held by each of the three major UK-wide parties, Conservative, Labour and Liberal. Allies of each main party have been counted with it in the normal way. 7 The Conservative numbers, however, exclude those Northern Irish Members who sat as either Conservative or Unionist. They were part of the Conservative Parliamentary Party from 1922 until 1972, when they broke with the Conservatives over the Heath government's suspension of Home Rule. Together with all the other (albeit sometimes warring) factions of Northern Irish Unionism, they are listed as 'NI Pro-Union' in column 4. Column 5 lists the (again, sometimes warring) Northern Irish nationalist MPs. Columns 6 and 7 are for the SNP and PC, respectively. Column 8 lists all others. Column 9 gives the total size of each house and column 10, the quota.
Governments may gain or lose seats between general elections. The notes to Table  4 list the relevant cases since 1922. In the Parliament of 1951-5, the largest party moved from non-winning to winning by gaining a seat. In the Parliament of October 1974-9, the largest party moved from winning to non-winning by losing seats. These two Parliaments are accordingly listed twice in Table 4 .
With only 12 seats among them for most of the period, the Northern Irish parties had little chance of emulating the old Irish Party. The pro-Union parties (column 4) have always won more than their population share of seats in NI, and the antiUnion parties (column 5) won fewer. This is not because of gerrymandering. Local government districts in NI have sometimes been gerrymandered, but Westminster constituencies have not directly been (see Rossiter, Johnston and Pattie, 1998) . Rather, the factions of unionism have been better at non-aggression pacts than have the factions of nationalism. Therefore, the pro-Union parties have never held fewer than nine of the Northern Irish seats. As the probability of being decisive is normally increasing with size, a bloc with 10 seats will usually have less a priori power than that wielded by Parnell's bloc with 80 seats. But the likelihood of their wielding any power at all is a function not only of their own size but also of the size of the other groups in the house.
As with Table 3, Table 4 gives, for all relevant Houses, the number of swings and the Penrose index for each party. Where it makes a difference, the indices are calculated separately on the basis of treating all the 'Others' as a single party and treating them as a set of single-member parties.
As explained above, the UK electoral system is highly responsive. At some times including the present, the system has also had a bias as between the two main parties. A bias between two leading parties exists if, at equal vote shares, one of them would win more seats than the other Cox and Katz, 2002; Johnston et al., 2002) . Currently, the bias in the British electoral system strongly favours the Labour party. This is for many reasons. One of them, although not the largest component, is the overrepresentation of Scotland and Wales (where Labour is relatively strong) compared to England and Northern Ireland.
The combination of bias and responsiveness means that the chances of small unionist and anti-unionist parties' being decisive are small. Table 4 It created a Boundary Commission whose 1925 report favoured the Unionists but not because of the Unionists in the Commons. They had no swing vote power. Each of the three big parties had equal power; the minorities had none. The government would fall whenever a coalition of the Liberals and Conservatives formed against it, as happened in October 1924. Irish politicians on both sides of the union debate were powerless bystanders.
The second minority Labour government of 1929-31 had far more seats than its predecessor (288 rather than 191), but its a priori power and that of the Liberal and Conservative parties were the same.
Any coalition of the two UK opposition parties against the government would oust it, and did in 1931 (aided by a government split). But no Irish faction had any say. There were no Irish policy initiatives under the second MacDonald government.
The case of 1951-3 is very interesting. The Conservatives, who then included the Ulster Unionists, won a narrow majority in the 1951 General Election. In 1953, they gained a seat from Labour -a feat that no incumbent government has managed since. From then on, the Conservative Party outside NI held an absolute majority of seats in the Commons, and the power of all other parties was 0. But so narrow was the government's majority before then that any opposition group, including the Ulster Unionists, could have forced it to change its policy if they all united against it. Harold Wilson then formed a minority Labour government, in effect daring his majority opponents to form a grand coalition to eject him. They never did, unlike in 1924. Wilson dissolved voluntarily in October of the same year. As in 1951, any coalition to force policy change would have to be very diverse.
The year saw dramatic developments in NI but the UUUC bloc had no direct role in them. In May, a Loyalist-organised strike against the Sunningdale power-sharing arrangements caused massive disruption to power and transport. After two weeks, the power-sharing executive, repudiated by the UUUC bloc and the strikers, resigned. Direct rule resumed. The UUUC bloc, by getting 51 percent of the vote in February, had shown the electoral weakness of the moderate faction of unionism. But it was not they who brought about the resumption of direct rule. The very fact that the Ulster Unionist bloc is unlikely to be pivotal in the House of Commons shows that direct rule is at best a mixed blessing, and at worst a curse, for Ulster Unionism.
The unforced change in Union policy that year concerned Scotland, not NI. The UUUC bloc had already reached its maximum potential size. But the plurality electoral system penalises parties with evenly-spread support until around 35 percent -then it violently swings round from punishment to reward. The seven Scottish Nationalists posed a more credible threat to UK policy than did the eleven-strong UUUC bloc.
With the October 1974 General Election, Wilson did get a paper-thin overall majority, but within two years, it had disappeared because of defections and by-election losses.
So from 1976 to 1979, the Unionist and anti-Unionist parties once again had nonzero power. Their power peaked in the last months of the parliament, as the economic and devolution policy of the government (led by Jim Callaghan since 1976) were both in tatters. An 'English backlash' rebellion in 1977 killed the Scotland and Wales Bill. Devolution was reintroduced in the shape of separate Scotland and Wales bills, but further backbench rebellions forced, first, a referendum requirement and, later, a requirement that a 'yes' to devolution was not to be enacted unless 40 percent of the electorate in the relevant territory had voted yes. The Penrose indices for this parliament show that the a priori power of the 10 Ulster Unionists, the 11 Scottish Nationalists and the 280 Conservatives was the same. On the Penrose index, each had, a priori, a 6.5 percent chance of being decisive.
When the crunch came, the relative strengths of the Ulster and Scottish lobbies had reversed from five years earlier. It was common knowledge that the SNP's electoral support had crumbled. Although consistency required them to mount a motion of no confidence in the government after the Scottish referendum result had produced a narrow yes vote that came nowhere near crossing the 40 percent threshold, Callaghan derided them as 'Turkeys voting for Christmas' (Butler and Kavanagh, 1980, p. 125) . Was this the first use of a now-commonplace phrase? In the days before the vote, the government looked everywhere for allies. They recruited PC in return for a promise of support for former slate quarrymen suffering from silicosis (a concession that former Labour members for the PC seats had failed to get from previous Labour governments). They agreed to increase the number of seats in NI from 12 to its population proportion of 17 (Rossiter, Johnston and Pattie, 1999, p. 105 ). This did not swing the two NI anti-Union MPs, who thought it would favour the Unionists. Their calculation has proven to be wrong -the anti-Union parties in NI now win considerably more seats, both absolutely and relative to the pro-Union parties -than before 1983 (Table 4 ). The 'Ulster MPs openly offered their votes for the speedy installation of a gas pipeline' (Butler and Kavanagh, 1980, p. 126) , but the government refused to concede that. It was defeated by one vote. The Conservatives won the ensuing general election. Devolution to Scotland and Wales did not revive until 1997. Constitutional change in NI remained on the agenda, culminating in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. In the run-up, policy had been bipartisan between the outgoing Conservative (Major) and the incoming Labour (Blair) parties.
The power indices thus confirm that none of the post-1922 parties which wish to modify the Union has been big enough to emulate Parnell. Only the SNP could grow to a size comparable to Parnell's party. But if the SNP grew to 50 or more seats, it could take the more direct route that it threatened in 1974, namely, to
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= { } 318 280 314 13 10 2 11 3 2 ; , , , , , , , negotiate directly for independence. The smaller groups are rarely pivotal except when the seat totals of the two big parties are close. But then they are caught on the other horn. When the seat totals of the two parties are very close, then all the small groups -pro-Union and anti-Union -are almost equally empowered, regardless of small differences in size. The Penrose indices show that on the five occasions when any group other than the incumbent government has had a priori power, either none of the non-English parties has (1923 and 1929) or all of them have (1951, 1974F and 1974O) . But in the latter case, their power cancels out, because a grand coalition against the government would involve those with fundamentally opposed views voting together on the very subject on which their views were fundamentally opposed. The Ulster groups might agree on pork (or gas), and they should have agreed that expansion in parliamentary seats was in their joint interest. They could never agree on constitutional change on which they have diametrically opposite views. We have found no evidence that they used their pivotal status then. Perhaps they did not realise it themselves.
Ulster Unionists have never been certain whether or not they wanted Home Rule for Ulster. Once they had it, they found that they liked 'a Protestant parliament and a Protestant state' in Craig's phrase of 1934 (quoted by Jackson, 2003, p. 229) . But a strand of Ulster Unionism clings to the Unionist ideology of A. V. Dicey and Sir Edward Carson, which wants a (Northern) Ireland fully integrated with the rest of the UK. In recent years, the most Diceyan of Ulster Unionists were James Molyneaux (leader of the Unionists at Westminster from 1979 to 1995) and his mentor Enoch Powell (MP for South Down, 1974-87) . Whatever may be the constitutional force of the Diceyan argument for union, the political science of it is brutal. Northern Irish Unionists have a vanishingly small chance of being uniquely decisive at Westminster.
Conclusion
The Labour party never had any voting power in terms of power index scores before 1914. Yet, there are many articles on Labour's attitude to National Insurance, the 1909 Budget, female suffrage and the rest of the pre-1914 agenda. There are almost no articles on the Irish Party's attitude, yet it did have voting power from 1910 to 1918. Why should this be?
Penrose's equiprobability assumption -that a priori, any combination of parties is as likely as any other (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996) . The key point is that the power indices defined in this way are useful as measures of a priori or constitutional power that results purely from the rules of decisionmaking, the weights and the quota, and should not be taken too literally as measuring actual power in an empirical sense. Recently, Leech (2003) has argued that there is an important distinction to be made between the voting power approach and the use of power indices, and that the former is more general than the latter, because it can produce results of a qualitative nature. Many of the results in this article are of this kind. For example, if a party has no swings, then its power is zero regardless of any assumptions about probabilistic voting. Finding such cases is an important application of the voting-power approach. 
